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Do Inspection and Traceability 
Provide Incentives 
for Food Safety? 
S. Andrew Starbird and Vincent Amanor-Boadu 
One of the  goals of inspection and  traceability is to motivate suppliers to deliver safer 
food. The ability of these policies to motivate suppliers depends on the accuracy of 
the inspection, the cost of failing inspection, the cost of causing a foodborne illness, 
and the proportion of  these costs paid by the supplier. We develop a model of  the 
supplier's expected cost as a function of inspection accuracy, the cost of failure, and 
the proportion of the failure cost that is allocated to suppliers. The model is used to 
identify the conditions under which the supplier is motivated to deliver uncontam- 
inated lots. Surprisingly, our results show that when safety failure costs can be 
allocated to suppliers, minimum levels of inspection error are required to motivate 
a supplier to deliver uncontaminated lots. This result does not hold when costs cannot 
be allocated to suppliers.  As a case study, we use our results to analyze the technical 
requirements for suppliers of  frozen beef to the USDA's  Agricultural Marketing 
Service. 
Key words: diagnostic error, food safety, inspection, sampling error, traceability 
Introduction 
One of the objectives of inspection and traceability systems is to improve the safety of 
the food supply. Inspection systems use sampling and testing to collect information 
about safety and quality. Buyers use the results of inspection to decide whether or not 
a supplier's product is safe enough to buy. Traceability systems accumulate information 
about product attributes, including safety and origin, as  the product moves through the 
supply chain. Traceability systems are defined by the breadth, depth, and precision of 
the accumulated information. The breadth of the  information refers to the  variety of the 
product attributes that are monitored, the depth of the information refers to how far the 
accumulated information moves through the supply chain, and the precision of  the 
information refers to its specificity and accuracy (Golan et al., 2004). 
The information generated by inspection and traceability systems does not, by itself, 
lead to an improvement in food safety. To influence food safety, the information must 
be used to remove unsafe food that is already in the supply chain, or to prevent unsafe 
food from ever entering the supply chain. In this analysis, we focus on  how these 
systems prevent unsafe food from entering the supply chain by motivating suppliers to 
produce and deliver safer food. Inspection systems motivate suppliers by generating a 
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significant cost when a lot fails inspection and must be scrapped. Traceability systems 
motivate suppliers by making it  possible to allocate the cost of unsafe food to the  source. 
Not every unsafe lot that passes inspection will cause an illness, but when it does, the 
cost of illness associated with contaminated food can be significant. Without inspection, 
unsafe food can enter the supply chain unhindered and,  without traceability, the supplier 
responsible for unsafe food cannot be identified. 
Improving food safety is only one of  the reasons to employ a traceability system. 
Hobbs (2004) identifies three distinct functions for traceability in a food supply chain: 
(a)  as a reactive traceback mechanism when contamination problems occur (externality 
cost-reduction function), (b)  to strengthen  liability incentives (liability function), and 
(c)  to verify credence quality attributes (ex ante quality verification). Here, we consider 
only the liability function of the traceability system. As this analysis will show, the 
liability function of a traceability system is not always effective in providing incentives 
to supply safer food. Even if the liability function is ineffective, the traceability system's 
other functions may be performing adequately. 
The power of inspection and traceability to motivate a supplier depends on inspection 
accuracy. Inspection is, unfortunately, subject to at  least two kinds of error. Diagnostic 
error occurs when samples are incorrectly diagnosed, and sampling error occurs when 
a sample is not representative of the lot from which it is drawn. Inspection error can 
result in safe product failing inspection and unsafe product passing inspection. These 
errors affect supplier profit, and consequently the ability of inspection and traceability 
to motivate the supplier. The effect of inspection error on motivation is not entirely clear. 
Inspection is a powerful incentive only if safe product passes and unsafe product fails 
inspection, and these events are more probable when inspection error is low. Through 
its liability function, traceability provides a powerful incentive only if unsafe product 
passes inspection, and this event is more probable when inspection error is high. 
The magnitude of inspection error, and therefore the incentive power of inspection 
and traceability, depend on the attributes of the inspection policy. Inspection policies 
can be negotiated directly between buyers and suppliers or they can be established by 
a third party such as a futures exchange or the government. Local governments are 
often responsible for the safety inspection of food service establishments, and federal 
and state governments are usually involved at the farm and first processor level. 
Contracts  between food buyers and suppliers often require that, at  a minimum, products 
pass all governmental safety inspections. It  is not uncommon, however, for contracts to 
include additional provisions for ensuring food safety. Some of the possibilities include 
requiring the seller to maintain a buyer-approved safety program, requiring tests for 
pathogens or contaminants not covered by government regulations, allowing onsite 
inspections by buyer representatives, and using more accurate diagnostic or sampling 
procedures. Ollinger (2004) found that private incentives are responsible for almost as 
much investment in food safety as public incentives. 
The goal of this research is to determine how inspection and the liability function of 
traceability influence the supplier's willingness to deliver safe food. The inspection 
system parameters examined include diagnostic error, sampling error, the  cost of failing 
inspection, and the cost of  an illness caused by  contaminated food (i.e., the cost of  a 
safety failure).  The willingness to supply safe food depends on the  magnitude and alloca- 
tion of these costs, which depend, in turn, on inspection error and the depth and precision 
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With a few notable exceptions, research addressing  the influence of inspection on the 
supply chain is quite limited. Bogetoft and Olesen (2004)  examine how the competitive 
environment influences investment in safety improvement in the pork supply chain. 
They demonstrate that improvements at different stages of  the supply chain are 
substitutes for one another and specifically consider testing for Salmonella. Mayer, 
Nickerson, and Owan (2004)  show how supply inspections and plant inspections are 
complements in some markets and substitutes in others, and they apply their results 
to a large biotechnology firm. Baiman, Fischer, and Rajan (2000)  examine the influence 
of  contractible information systems on the supplier's quality improvement effort, the 
buyer's inspection effort, and product quality. Finally, Hueth and Ligon (1999)  explore 
how price provides quality information when quality measurement is imperfect. 
The work on inspection is closely related to research addressing the influence of uncer- 
tainty on decisions involving product quality. As reported by Heinkel (1981),  imperfect 
test technology can increase total surplus, and the total surplus is a function of the test 
accuracy. Chalfant et  al. (1999)  and Chalfant and Sexton (2002)  examine the influence 
of grading error on adverse selection in the California prune industry. They conclude 
that while grading error can contribute to adverse selection, adverse selection can 
sometimes improve industrywide welfare. 
Traceability is an increasingly common topic of  research in economics. Hobbs et al. 
(2005)  note that  traceability systems must  be combined with a quality assurance system 
for traceability to be of value to consumers. Winfree and McCluskey (2005)  show that in 
the absence of traceability, fms  choose quality levels which are suboptimal in terms of 
the collective reputation of  a group. Meuwissen et al. (2003)  analyze the interaction be- 
tween certification schemes and traceability systems. Dickinson and Bailey (2002)  report 
on experiments  involving consumers'willingness to pay for traceability, transparency, and 
extra assurances regarding safety. Finally, Smyth and Phillips (2002)  consider trace- 
ability, segregation, and identity preservation as strategies for product differentiation. 
Over the last 25 years, renewed public interest in food safety has resulted in 
increasing research in this area. Recent food safety research has focused on consumer 
perceptions regarding food  safety and on producer  processes to enhance safety by 
controlling pathogens. Examples of research on consumer perceptions include Marsh, 
Schroeder, and Mintert (2004);  Atsushi and Kikuchi (2004);  Nayga, Poghosyan, and 
Nichols (2004);  and Clayton, Griffith, and Price (2003).  Research focusing on producer 
processes to control pathogens is more directly related to our work and includes van der 
Gaag et al. (2004)  who use a simulation model to predict the spread of  Salmonella 
throughout the pork supply chain. Patil and Frey (2004)  use sensitivity analysis to 
identify critical control points related to food safety in a processing facility. Malcolm et 
al. (2004)  evaluate the economic effectiveness of  pathogen reduction technologies in 
cattle slaughter facilities. Finally, an analysis by Elbasha and Riggs (2003)  is  especially 
interesting in that it attempts to identify the appropriate allocation of  preventative 
effort between consumers and producers. 
In this study, we build upon the existing literature by showing how inspection and 
traceability systems interact to motivate the supplier to deliver safe food. Our findings 
suggest that greater supplier liability and more accurate inspection do not unambigu- 
ously lead to more powerful incentives or to safer food. The relationship between inspec- 
tion and traceability systems influences the supply of  safe food, and so understanding 
the relationship is vitally important for buyers, regulators, and consumers. Starbird and Amanor-Boadu  Inspection and Traceability as Food Safety Incentives  17 
The Model 
We assume that suppliers can exert effort to improve the safety of their product and 
that safety is measured by the contamination rate, 0 s q s 1. We also assume safer food 
costs more to produce and the cost of production per lot is c(q), where c' < 0 and c" > 0. 
The cost of no detectable contamination is assumed to be finite, and we define c0  = ~(0). 
In some supply chains, the market price is a function of quality, but here it is assumed 
that the  price is zero for lots that fail inspection and w for lots that pass inspection. The 
supplier observes w and selects q in order to maximize expected utility. 
The inspection can be performed by the buyer or a third party (the government or an 
independent laboratory, for example) and is paid for by the  buyer. If a supplier's lot fails 
inspection, then no transaction occurs. The inspection procedure is imperfect, so some 
contaminated lots pass inspection and some uncontaminated lots fail inspection. If a 
contaminated lot passes inspection, it  causes a food safety failure for the  buyer or for the 
buyer's customers. We assume the origin of lots is traceable, and if a supplier's lot 
causes a food safety failure, the supplier is responsible for a portion of the cost of the 
failure. 
Contamination influences the supplier's expected utility through the expected cost of 
an inspection failure and the expected cost of a food safety failure. The cost of  failing 
inspection (r,) includes the cost of disposal, scrap, and any fines levied by the govern- 
ment. The supplier's expected cost of inspection failure is a function of the probability 
of failing inspection, which is a function of the contamination rate, sampling error, and 
diagnostic error. 
The cost of  a food safety failure (re)  includes the direct cost of  liability, recalls, and 
fines levied due to safety failures. This cost includes the social cost of safety failures to 
the extent these costs are translated into direct economic sanctions. The responsibility 
for a food safety failure is shared by the supplier, the buyer, and other downstream 
users. The cost of  a food safety failure (re)  and the portion for which the supplier is 
responsible are functions of the traceability system. One of  the functions of the 
traceability system is to reduce externality costs when a contamination problem occurs 
(Hobbs, 2004). If traceback information is precise, then the health impact of contamin- 
ation can be restricted, and re  will be reduced. Similarly, precise traceback information 
may affect the proportion of re that the supplier is obligated to pay. Precise traceback 
may reveal that a safety failure is due to errors made by the buyer instead of  the 
supplier, for instance. 
For the purposes of this analysis, both re and the proportion of re for which the sup- 
plier is responsible are assumed to be constant and known by the buyer and supplier. 
If the nature of the traceability system is changed (i.e., the depth, breadth, or precision 
of the traced information is changed), then the failure cost and failure cost allocation 
will also change. 
We use TC, denoted as the failure cost allocation factor, to represent the proportion of 
re  for which the supplier is responsible when a food safety failure occurs. The supplier's 
expected failure cost depends on the probability of a food safety failure, which depends 
on the probability that a contaminated lot passes inspection, which in turn depends on 
the  contamination rate, the diagnostic error, and the sampling error. Figure 1  illustrates 
the flow of product and cost in this stylized supply chain. 18  April2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
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Figure 1. Flowchart of the food supply chain 
The Probability of  a Failure 
Two failure probabilities influence the supplier's expected utility: the  probability of 
failing inspection (1  - P(q))  and the probability of a food safety failure (q(q)).  These 
probabilities depend on the  inspection policy which is subject to  both diagnostic and 
sampling error. Diagnostic error is a function of the sensitivity (a)  of the test for 
contamination (the  probability of a positive test for contamination given the sample 
is contaminated), and the specificity (P) of the test for contamination (the  probabil- 
ity of a negative test for contamination given the sample is uncontaminated). Diagnostic 
errors are classified as false positives or false negatives, with probabilities 1 - P and 
1  - a,  respectively. Test sensitivity and specificity are  different for different pathogens. 
For example, Qualicon, the  division of Dupont that  manufactures screening  tests  for 
Salmonella,  E. coli, Listeria, and other pathogens,  reports sensitivity and specificity 
of over 99% for its  E. coli screening test and over 98% for its  Salmonella screening 
test. 
The other source of  error in the inspection procedure is sampling error. Sampling 
error occurs when the characteristics of a sample are different than the characteristics 
of the lot from which it is drawn. For our purposes, sampling error is defined as the 
probability that an uncontaminated sample is drawn from a contaminated lot, and e is 
used to represent this probability. It is assumed that the probability of a contaminated 
sample being drawn from an uncontaminated lot is zero, and the probability of an 
uncontaminated sample being drawn from an  uncontaminated lot is one. The sampling 
error is more difficult to estimate than the diagnostic error because it depends on how 
lots are assembled, shipped, delivered, and sampled. Research on bulk sampling error 
in  food safety is virtually nonexistent, even though good models for its estimation exist 
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Using these definitions of  sensitivity, specificity, and sampling error, we can define 
the probability that a lot passes inspection as: 
and the probability that a contaminated lot passes inspection as: 
The probability of  a lot passing inspection [equation (I)] is the sum of  the probability 
that a lot is contaminated and passes inspection, [(I  - a)(l  -  E) + Pelq, and the probabil- 
ity that a lot is uncontaminated and passes inspection, P(1- q). A contaminated lot can 
pass inspection if a contaminated sample is drawn but it is incorrectly diagnosed, or if 
an  uncontaminated sample is drawn and it is correctly diagnosed. For notational ease, 
we define y = (1  - &)a  + ~(1-  P), which is the probability of a positive test given a lot is con- 
taminated. Thus, P(q)  = (1  - y)q +  P(1- q), and ~(q)  = (1  - y)qlP. Some straightforward 
analysis shows that Pq = 1  - y - j3,  and 7,  = (1  - y)PIP2,  where subscripts indicate partial 
derivatives. 
The Supplier's Objective Function 
If we assume the supplier is risk neutral, and recall the market price is fixed at w for 
all lots that pass inspection,  the supplier's objective is simply to minimize expected cost: 
c(q)  rt (1  -P(q))  Min  G(q) = -  +  + nrev(q). 
9  P(q)  P(q) 
The first term in G(q)  is the expected cost of producing a deliverable lot. In order to sell 
one lot at w, the supplier must produce l/P(q) lots to make up for the lots that fail 
inspection. The second term in G(q)  is the expected cost of  an inspection failure and the 
third term in G(q) is the expected cost of  a food safety failure. Assuming risk neutrality 
allows us to ignore the size of  the transaction and focus on the influence of  inspection 
error on supplier behavior. 
The necessary condition for an interior solution to (3) is: 
and the sufficient condition is 
Rearranging (41, an interior extremum is found to exist if 20  April2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The left-hand side of (6) is the marginal reduction in production cost associated with 
increasing the contamination rate, and the right-hand side is the marginal increase in 
the expected cost of inspection and food safety failure associated with an  increase in q. 
At an  optimum, the marginal increase in failure costs must equal the marginal decline 
in the production cost. Otherwise, the supplier will benefit from either increasing or 
decreasing the contamination rate. 
No Detectable Contamination 
Equations (4) and (5) identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for an interior 
optimum, but our primary interest is the conditions under which a corner solution is 
optimal. In  particular, we are  interested in  the influence of the inspection policy param- 
eters (a, p, and E),  the failure costs (r,  and re),  and the failure cost allocation factor (n) 
on the supplier's motivation to deliver no detectable contamination, q = 0. The supplier's 
optimal (local) solution is no detectable contamination (q" = 0) when G,  > 0 at  q = 0. If 
Gq > 0, then any increase in the supplier's  contamination rate also increases the 
supplier's expected cost and decreases the supplier's expected utility. 
At q = 0, we know that P(0) = P, Pq = 1  - y - P, and 11,  = (1  - y)lP. Substituting  these 
values into (6) gives the following condition for q" = 0: 
where  c0  =do),  c:  = cq(0),  and y = (1  -  &)a  + ~(1-  p). Equation (7)requires that  the marginal 
reduction in cost associated with relaxing food safety efforts is less than the marginal 
increase in the failure costs associated with relaxing food safety efforts at  q = 0. 
Traceability, Failure Costs, and  the 
Supply of  Safe Food 
Equation (7) can be rearranged to identify the values of n, re,  and r, that lead to q" = 0: 
Conditions (81, (9), and (10) show the minimum values for the safety failure cost alloca- 
tion factor, safety failure cost, and inspection failure required to ensure that q" = 0. The 
failure cost allocation factor and the two failure costs are clearly substitutes for one 
another in  motivating the supplier to deliver q" = 0. The power of these incentives, how- 
ever, is closely related to the accuracy of the inspection protocol. Starbird and Amanor-Boadu  Inspection and Traceability as Food Safety Incentives  21 
Inspection Error and the Supply of  Safe Food 
We can also rearrange (7)  to identify the values of (1  - a)  and c that are consistent with 
q"  = 0. The value (1  - a)  is the probability that a contaminated sample is misdiagnosed, 
and E is the probability that an uncontaminated sample is drawn from a contaminated 
lot. No detectable contamination is the supplier's optimal solution if: 
and nre  > (cO  + rt)/P;  i.e., the expected cost per contaminated lot that passes inspection 
is greater than the expected cost per lot that fails inspection [recall,  P(0) = PI. Strangely, 
the left-hand sides of (11)  and (12) represent the lower limits on these probabilities. If 
the  error falls below these limits, then the supplier's optimal contamination rate is more 
than zero. 
This result is counterintuitive but not inexplicable. The key is the requirement that 
nre > (cO  + rt)lP. If nre is greater than (cO  + rt)lP, then the supplier pays more for a 
contaminated lot that passes inspection than for a lot that fails inspection. Of course, 
contaminated lots pass inspection only if diagnostic error or sampling error exists. The 
higher the diagnostic and sampling error, the greater the probability of a contaminated 
lot passing inspection, the greater the probability the supplier pays me,  and the greater 
the  motivation to reduce contamination. Conditions (11)  and (12)  identify the minimum 
sampling and diagnostic errors which make the safety failure cost significant enough 
to motivate the supplier to produce at  q" = 0. 
If there is no diagnostic or sampling error, then the buyer is indifferent to the 
supplier's contamination rate because no contaminated lots will pass inspection. Unfor- 
tunately, inspection error, and especially sampling error, is likely to remain a problem 
in food safety inspection protocols. The conditions presented above provide guidelines 
for ensuring q" = 0 even when inspection error exists. 
Anonymity 
Some parts of the food industry work under conditions of relative anonymity-i.e.,  no 
information about product origin moves through the supply chain. Under conditions of 
anonymity, the supplier cannot be held responsible for food safety failures. Usually this 
occurs when raw materials are commingled as a part of  processing. When there is no 
traceability, then no failure costs can be allocated to the supplier (IT = 01,  and the 
supplier pays no penalties for food safety failures. 
Recall, one of  the conditions for (11) and (12) is that nr, > (cO  + rt)lP. If n is close to 
zero, then this condition is not true, and therefore the inequalities in (11)  and (12) are 
reversed. In this situation, we have a maximum level of  inspection error which will 
motivate the supplier to achieve q" = 0. The lower the diagnostic and sampling error, the 
lower the probability that a contaminated lot passes inspection, the greater the supplier's 22  April 2006  Journal of AgriculturaI and Resource Economics 
cost of inspection failure, and the greater the supplier's motivation to reduce contam- 
ination to its minimum. 
Our results show that the food safety failure cost (r,)  and inspection failure cost (re) 
are substitutes for each other in motivating the supplier to deliver q" = 0. Further, the 
diagnostic error and  the  inspection error are substitutes for each other in motivating the 
supplier. Finally, a traceability system that allocates failure cost to suppliers is found 
to be an effective incentive only if the inspection error is nonzero. Stated another way, 
in  traceability systems with a large sc, increased accuracy can result in lower expected 
failure cost. Therefore, increased accuracy may become a disincentive to providing safer 
food. In the following section, these results are used to evaluate an existing contract for 
ground beef. 
Case Study: 
The AMS  Ground Beef Contract 
The USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS)  purchases food for the  National 
School Lunch Program and other federal feeding programs. Frozen beef in fine, coarse, 
and ground form is one of the livestock products purchased by the AMS. In fiscal year 
2004, the AMS purchased  135.12 million pounds of  frozen beef from 23 vendors for 
$2 13.31  million. Quality specifications for frozen ground beef are  published in the  AMS7s 
Technical Requirements Schedule GB-2005.  The technical requirements specify  product 
codes, domestic origin and slaughter requirements, traceability requirements, fat 
content, patty weight and thickness, and microbial testing requirements. The technical 
requirements associated with microbial pathogens are designed so that suppliers (or 
"contractors" in the AMS vernacular) are motivated to deliver uncontaminated lots. As 
we have shown, the strength of this motivation depends on inspection error and the cost 
of failure. 
Under the AMS technical requirements, inspecting ground beef for microbial 
pathogens requires sampling from each lot. A lot is defined as the quantity produced 
between "clean-ups," but not less than 10,000  pounds. The sampling procedure requires 
that each lot is divided into approximately 2,000-pound increments, each increment is 
sampled, and the samples are combined to create a composite sample. For microbes 
other than  E. coli 0157:H7, the samples are  analyzed usingprocedures published in the 
Compendium  of Methods for  the Microbiological Examination ofFoods (Downes and Ito, 
2001). For E. coli 0157:H7, the ground beef samples are tested using the methods set 
forth in the USDA  Microbiology Laboratory Guidebook (Dey and Lattuada, 1998). The 
Guidebook requires E. coli screening tests to have a sensitivity of  at least 98% and a 
specificity of at least 90%. 
The inspection failure cost for suppliers is difficult to quantify. The status of AMS 
frozen beef suppliers is either "process assessment status,"  "conditional status," or 
"ineligible." To move up the status hierarchy, a supplier must have an approved quality 
control plan and have 20 consecutive lots with no detectible E. coli 0157:H7, among 
other things. The cost of failing a test for E. coli 0157:H7 is a change in status  to either 
conditional or ineligible, and subsequently, the cost of moving back up the hierarchy. 
The AMS controls the cost of moving up the hierarchy, and therefore the cost of failing 
inspection. Starbird and Amanor-Boadu  Inspection and Traceability as Food Safety Incentives  23 
Table 1. Optimal Contamination Rates (q') for Different Combinations of 
Inspection Failure Cost (r,)  and Sampling Error (E) 
Inspection Failure  Sampling Error (E) 
Cost (r,)  0.0  0.005  0.015  0.02 
Optimal Contamination Rate (9') -  -  - - -  - - -  - -  > 
0.125  0.089  0.056 
0.091  0.059  0.029 
0.061  0.031  0.004 
0.033  0.005  0.000 
0.007  0.000  0.000 
0.000  0.000  0.000 
The food safety failure cost for frozen beef suppliers is also difficult to quantify. A food 
safety failure traced back to a supplier would result, at a minimum, in a loss of  the 
current contract, and probably a loss of future contracts with the AMS. If a consumer 
develops an  illness and sues the supplier (and the AMS), then the costs clearly increase. 
In a survey of  court cases involving foodborne illnesses, Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco 
(2001)  found only a third of the cases resulted in payment to the plaintiff, with a mean 
award of about $133,000. If the victim of food poisoning originating from AMS- 
distributed ground beef wins a case, it seems likely the supplier would share the cost of 
the award with other firms and agencies in the supply chain. Consequently, we suspect 
that IT  < 1. 
The AMS's objective is to design the technical requirements of the contract so that 
suppliers deliver only uncontaminated lots. The AMS has little control over the cost of 
a food safety failure, and we assume the minimum requirements for test sensitivity and 
specificity are defined by  other governmental agencies (perhaps in consultation with 
AMS). Therefore, we concentrate on using the sampling error (E) and inspection failure 
cost (r,)  to motivate suppliers. The sampling error is a function of the lot size, increment 
size, and compositing procedures (Schilling, 1982).  The inspection failure cost is a func- 
tion of the rules for change of status and the requirements for acquiring and  reacquiring 
process assessment status. What levels of  E and r, will motivate suppliers to deliver 
uncontaminated product? 
Table 1  reports the optimal contamination rates (9")  for a supplier facing different 
levels of r, and E. As expected, the supplier's optimal contamination rate falls as the 
inspection failure cost increases. The counterintuitive result is also evident: the  optimal 
contamination rate falls as the sampling error increases. In constructing table 1, it is 
assumed that the  AMS technical requirements are satisfied. The sensitivity of the diag- 
nostic test must be at least 98%, so the probability of a false negative (1  - a)  is 2%. The 
specificity of the diagnostic test must be at  least 90%, so we set P = 0.90. For simplicity, 
costs are assumed to be scaled so that the cost of producing a lot is c(q) = exp(-29); i.e., 
the cost of producing an uncontaminated lot is c0 = $1, and c;  = -2. The cost of a food 
safety failure has not been estimated for frozen ground beef specifically.  However, given 
Buzby, Frenzen, and Rasco's (2001)  findings, we are comfortable assuming that  the food 
safety failure cost is 50 times the cost of production, so we set re  = $50. Finally, we 
assume the supplier is liable for half of this safety failure cost (IT = 0.50). 24  April 2006  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Table 2. Minimum Safety Failure Cost Allocation (IT)  Required to Motivate 
a Supplier to Deliver Uncontaminated Lots, as a Function of Inspection 
Failure Cost (r,)  and Sampling Error (E) 
Sampling Error (E)  Inspection Failure 
Cost (r,)  0.0  0.005  0.015  0.02 
<- -  - Minimum Safety Failure Cost Allocation Factor (sr)  -  - -  > 
0.0  NF "  0.842  0.717  0.625 
" NF = not feasible. 
Next we consider how the safety failure cost allocation factor and sampling error 
interact in this contract. Table 2 shows the minimum safety failure cost allocation 
required to motivate the supplier to deliver uncontaminated lots as a function of r,  and 
E. As the  error increases, IT declines, indicating these parameters are  substitutes  for each 
other in accomplishing the objective of  safer food. One important implication of this 
relationship is that if sampling error declines-due  to improved sampling procedures, 
for instance-then  the cost allocation factor must be increased in order to maintain the 
incentive to deliver uncontaminated lots. The AMS can use this information to guide 
construction of the  technical requirements for frozen ground beef. While the  relationship 
between most parameters and the supplier's incentives is straightforward, the impact 
of  sampling error on the optimal contamination rate is unexpected but not unpredict- 
able. 
Conclusions 
Inspection and traceability are not unique food industry policies. Many different 
organizations and government agencies use inspection and traceability to encourage 
individuals and organizations to comply with behavioral standards. For example, the 
U.S.  Internal Revenue Service uses the threat of  audits to encourage taxpayers to 
complete accurate and truthful tax returns. The threat of an expensive citation, among 
other things, motivates drivers to comply with parking and traffic laws. The possibility 
of getting caught encourages students to refrain from plagiarism. The menace of legal 
action motivates companies to fulfill their contractual obligations. And teenagers are 
often motivated to follow established behavioral norms by the threat of  "grounding." 
Getting caught, audited, or cited are incentives only if there is a chance of these events 
occurring, and if the cost of  these events is significant. Anything that reduces the 
probability or the  cost of getting caught, audited, or cited, also reduces the incentive 
power of these events. 
In general, inspection and traceability provide the incentives we expect in the food 
supply chain. Specifically,  there are minimum failure costs and failure cost allocations 
(IT)  that motivate a supplier to deliver uncontaminated lots. The relationship between Starbird and Amanor-Boadu  Inspection and Traceability as  Food Safety Incentives  25 
the traceability system and inspection error is less clear, however. The traceability system 
provides an incentive only if safety failures can occur, can generate cost, and the cost 
can be allocated to the responsible supplier. Safety failures occur only if contaminated 
lots pass inspection, and contaminated lots pass inspection only if there is inspection 
error. Counter to what one might expect, therefore, when the failure cost allocation 
factor is large, there is a minimum level of inspection error needed to motivate a supplier 
to deliver q" = 0. 
Our results do not imply that traceability can be used in place of inspection or that 
inspection can be used instead of traceability to motivate suppliers to deliver safer food. 
On the contrary, when inspection error exists, a traceability system which allocates 
safety failure costs to suppliers increases the incentive to supply safer food. This incen- 
tive increases with the inspection error and with the proportion of failure cost paid by 
the  supplier. As the  inspection error disappears, however, so does the  incentive provided 
by the traceability system. 
In order to design effective incentives, buyers and regulators who want uncontamin- 
ated lots need to understand the interaction between a supply chain's inspection and 
traceability system. The best incentive system will depend on the relative magnitude 
of inspection failure and safety failure costs. Indeed, the primary weakness in our case 
analysis of the AMS contract for ground beef is quantifying the cost of failing inspection 
and the cost of a safety failure. When the  inspection failure cost is  low and safety failure 
cost is high, then increasing accuracy is unlikely to provide a meaningful incentive. 
Increased accuracy will save little in inspection failure cost and will reduce the  incentive 
provided by the safety failure cost. If inspection failure cost is high relative to the safety 
failure cost, however, then increased accuracy is likely to provide a significant incentive 
to suppliers. These conclusions are consistent with the hypotheses posed by  Barzel 
(1982)  regarding the cost of measuring quality (by  inspection) and  the  willingness to pay 
for differentiated products. 
One of the unrealistic assumptions in our analysis is that  failure costs and inspection 
errors are known by the supplier. In  some supply chains this is a reasonable assumption, 
but in others it  is not. In some cases, suppliers will have better information about inspec- 
tion failure costs than buyers, and buyers will have better information about inspection 
error than suppliers. Future research should address the influence of the asymmetric 
information about inspection parameters and costs on buyer and supplier behavior. 
[Received September 2005;Jinal revision received February 2006.1 
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